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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DOUBLE'JEOPARDY-JUVENILE COURT PROCEDURE-STATE EXCEPTIONS TO MASTER'S PROPOSALS-The Supreme

Court of the United States has held that a Maryland juvenile rule
that allows the state to file exceptions to a master's proposed find-

ings and recommendations with a juvenile judge does not violate the
double jeopardy clause even though the juvenile judge is free to
accept, reject, or modify the proposals or to supplement the record,
since the master's hearing and review by the judge constitutes a
single proceeding.
Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978).
In November of 1974, nine Maryland juveniles' filed a class action2 in United States district court 3 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 seek-

ing an injunction and declaratory relief against the State's Attorney
for Baltimore City.5 The complaint challenged the constitutionality
of Rule 908e of the Maryland Rules of Procedure,' under the author1. By the time of final argument before the district court, only one of the named plaintiffs
still had an ongoing controversy against the state. The state had either withdrawn its exceptions against the other named plaintiffs or completed the adjudicatory process by securing a
ruling from the juvenile court judge. Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 n.11 (1978).
2. The class action was filed pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Brady v. Swisher, 436 F. Supp. 1361 (D. Md. 1977). Because an injunction was sought
against the operation of certain Maryland statutes and rules upon the ground of their unconstitutionality, a three judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1970)
(amended 90 Stat. 1119 (1976)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
5. Also included as defendants were the operations chief of the State's Attorney's office
for Baltimore City, the chief state attorney assigned to the Baltimore City juvenile court and
the clerk of that court.
6. At the time the action was filed, the use of masters in juvenile proceedings was governed by Rule 908e, MD. ANN. CODE (1971), which provided in pertinent part:
1. Hearing Before Master.
The master shall hear such cases as may be assigned to him by the court and upon
the conclusion of the hearing shall announce his findings and recommendations. All
papers relating to the case together with the master's findings and recommendations
shall then be transmitted to the judge.
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ity of which the state had filed exceptions with the juvenile court
to a master's findings that the charges against the juveniles were
unsupported beyond a reasonable doubt.7 In accordance with the
rule, a juvenile court judge held de novo hearings on the exceptions
and reversed the master's findings.' The juveniles alleged that this
procedure violated the double jeopardy clause' made applicable to
the states by the fourteenth amendment,I and sought to prevent the
future operation of the rule."
Before the class action was heard, the Maryland legislature en2. Exceptions to Findings or Recommendations.
Exceptions by a petitioner after a delinquency hearing may only be taken by the
State's Attorney.
3. Orders of Judge.
In the absence of exceptions, the master's findings and recommendations shall
promptly be confirmed, modified or remanded by the judge. If within the specified
time, exceptions are filed, the judge shall hear the entire matter or such specific
matters as set forth in the exceptions de novo.
7. At the conclusion of the juvenile court trial, which is known in Maryland as the adjudicatory hearing, findings are made regarding the commission of a "delinquent act," which is
an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult. If the juvenile court finds that a
delinquent act was committed, a separate disposition hearing is held. Under Maryland law,
a "delinquent child" is one who has committed a delinquent act and requires guidance,
treatment or rehabilitation. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-801(k)(1), 3-820 (1977
Cum. Supp.).
8. Brief for Appellees at 19, Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Appellees]. Five of the juveniles were confined in juvenile detention centers, one
was placed on probation and the other three faced potential confinement. At the same time
that the class action was brought, the juveniles also sought federal habeas corpus relief. In
Aldridge v. Dean, 395 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Md. 1975), habeas corpus relief was granted to the
six petitioners already subjected to a de novo hearing. The petitions of the remaining three
were dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 1173.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The double jeopardy clause provides: "[N]or shall any person
be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
10. Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699, 2702 (1978). See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969) (successive state prosecutions for the same offense barred by double jeopardy clause).
11. 98 S. Ct. 2703. Prior to seeking federal relief, the juveniles exhausted their appeals in
the Maryland court system. In the case of juvenile defendant William Anderson, the juvenile
court judge granted a motion to dismiss the notice of state's exceptions, concluding that a
de novo hearing would violate his right to be free from double jeopardy. The judge granted
the same relief to similarly situated juveniles. Several of those juveniles initiated the § 1983
action. Id.
The court of special appeals reversed the decision of the juvenile court judge. In re Anderson, 20 Md. App. 31, 315 A.2d 540 (1974). The court held that jeopardy attached at the
proceeding before the master and terminated only upon the adjudication by the juvenile court
judge. The juveniles appealed and the court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the defendants were not placed in jeopardy at the master's hearing since the master did not have the
power to enter a final order. In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 321 A.2d 516 (1974).
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acted a statute 2 which, for the first time, provided a legislative basis
for the use of masters in juvenile proceedings.' 3 The statute altered
the existing procedure by providing that the juvenile, as well as the
state, could take exceptions to the master's findings and explicitly
stated that the master's proposals and recommendations do not
constitute orders or final action of the court. The statute provided
for a de novo hearing or a hearing on the record by the court" at the
choice of the excepting party.
In Aldridge v. Dean,' 5 a habeas corpus proceeding in which six of
the Swisher plaintiffs were involved, the single-judge district court
held that Rule 908e's provision for a de novo hearing on the state's
exceptions to the master's findings violated the double jeopardy
clause." In response to the enactment of the statute and the
Aldridge decision, the Maryland Court of Appeals promulgated
Rule 911'1 which modified the role of masters in juvenile proceed§

3-813 (1977 Cum. Supp.).

12.
13.

MD. CTS. & JtD. PROC. CODE ANN.
98 S. Ct. at 2704.

14.

Id. § 3-813(b) required the master to record the proceeding and make his recommen-

dations and proposals in writing to the juvenile court.

15. 395 F. Supp. 1161 (D. Md. 1975). See note 8 supra.
16. 98 S. Ct. at 2704.
17. Rule 911, MD. ANN. CODE (1977) provides:
a. Authority
1. Detention or Shelter Care.
A master is authorized to order detention or shelter care in accordance with Rule 912
(Detention or Shelter Care) subject to an immediate review by a judge if requested by
any party.
2. Other Matters.
A master is authorized to hear any cases and matters assigned to him by the court,
except a hearing on a waiver petition. The findings, conclusions and recommendations
of a master do not constitute orders or final action of the court.
b. Report of the Court.
Within ten days following the conclusion of the disposition hearing by a master, he
shall transmit to the judge the entire file in the case, together with a written report of
his proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, recommendations and proposed orders
with respect to adjudication and disposition. A copy of his report and proposed order
shall be served upon each party as provided by Rule 306 (Service of Pleadings and
Other Papers).
c. Review by the Court if Exceptions Filed.
Any party may file exceptions to the master's proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations and proposed orders. Exceptions shall be in writing, filed with the clerk
within five days after the master's report is served upon the party, and shall specify
those items to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de novo or on
the record. A copy shall be served upon all other parties pursuant to Rule 306 (Service
of Pleadings and Other Papers).
Upon the filing of exceptions, a prompt hearing shall be scheduled on the exceptions.
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ings. 5 The purpose of Rule 911 is to emphasize that the master's
findings and recommendations are mere proposals and non-final in
nature. 9 Under the rule, the state no longer has the power to secure
a de novo hearing before the judge. It may still file exceptions, but
the judge is limited to a consideration of the master's record and any
additional evidence requested by the prosecution to which the juvenile agrees. The judge can also supplement the record for his own
review with additional evidence to which there is no objection by
either party.20
After the effective date of Rule 911, the juveniles amended their
complaint to bring the new rule within its scope.2 ' The district court
certified the proposed class 22 to consist of all juveniles involved in
the proceedings where the state filed exceptions to a master's proposed finding of non-delinquency.2 3 The district court held that a
An excepting party other than the State may elect a hearing de novo or a hearing on
the record. If the State is thae excepting party, the hearing shall be on the record,
supplemented by such additional evidence as the judge considers relevant and to which
the parties raise no objection. In either case the hearing shall be limited to those
matters to which exceptions have been taken.
d. Review by the Court in Absence of Exceptions.
In the absence of timely and proper exceptions, the master's proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law and recommendations may be adopted by the court and the proposed or other appropriate orders may be entered based on them. The court may
remand the case to the master for further hearings, or may, on its own motion, schedule
and conduct a further hearing supplemented by such additional evidence as the court
considers relevant and to which the parties raise no objection. Action by the court
under this section shall be taken within two days after the expiration of the time for
filing exceptions.
18. 98 S. Ct. at 2704.
19. See Rule 911b set forth at note 17 supra.
20. 98 S. Ct. at 2704. See Rule 911c at note 17 supra.
21. 98 S. Ct. at 2705. The district court concluded that under Maryland law, Rule 911
superseded § 3-813 which was the earlier enactment of the state legislature governing juvenile
proceedings. Brady v. Swisher, 436 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (D. Md. 1977). Thus, only Rule 911
was involved in the constitutional challenge before the district court in the class action and
in the Supreme Court. 98 S. Ct. at 2707 n.13.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) provides that an action may be maintained as a class action
if "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; . . ."
23. After final argument, but before the district court announced its decision, the state
withdrew its exceptions to the master's proposals regarding the single remaining plaintiff with
a live controversy. Thus, there was a mootness question involved with the class action. The
district court nevertheless certified the class and the Supreme Court concluded that the
state's withdrawal of the exceptions did not deprive the district court of the power to do so.
98 S. Ct. at 2705 n.11. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
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juvenile is placed in jeopardy at the master's hearing since a potential consequence includes the loss of liberty for several years.24 In the
district court's view, Rule 911 was unconstitutional because it
granted the state more than one opportunity to convince a trier of
fact of the juvenile's guilt. Thus, the juvenile court judge's review
of the record constituted a second proceeding at which jeopardy
attached. 25 The court rejected the state's contention that jeopardy
continued from the master's hearing until a final adjudication by a
juvenile court judge.2 6 Accordingly, the court enjoined state officials
from thereafter taking exceptions to either a master's proposed find27
ing of non-delinquency or his proposed disposition.
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction 28 solely to determine whether the double jeopardy clause prohibits state officials,
acting in accordance with Rule 911, from taking exceptions to a
master's findings. In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed. 21 Speaking
through Chief Justice Burger, the Court initially addressed the
threshold question of whether jeopardy attached at the hearing before the master.3 In concluding that jeopardy did attach, the court
relied on Breed v. Jones3' in which it decided that a juvenile was
exposed to double jeopardy when subjected to a proceeding in an
adult court 2 following an adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court
based on the same delinquency offense.3 But the Court also distin24. 436 F. Supp. at 1365-66. The district court based its decision on Breed v. Jones, 421
U.S. 519 (1975). For a discussion of Breed see notes 53-65 and accompanying text infra.
25. 436 F. Supp. at 1368-69.
26. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied primarily on United States v.
Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975). For a discussion of Jenkins see note 41 and accompanying text
infra.
27. 436 F. Supp. at 1370.
28. Swisher v. Brady, 434 U.S. 963 (1977).
29. Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-08 (1978). Justices Marshall, Powell, and
Brennan dissented.
30. Id. at 2706 n.12. The dissenters agreed with the majority on this issue. See note 45
and accompanying text infra.
31. 421 U.S. 519 (1975). Breed extended double jeopardy clause protection to defendants
in juvenile court proceedings. The Court decided that a juvenile was put in jeopardy "at a
proceeding whose object is to determine whether he has committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years." Id. at 529.
32. The case in the adult criminal court was submitted to that court on the transcript of
the preliminary hearing. Id. at 525. Thus, it was not the rigors of a jury trial that caused the
adult proceeding to place the juvenile in jeopardy for a second time.
33. 98 S. Ct. at 2708. The majority stated that for the purpose of determining when
jeopardy attached, a Rule 911 proceeding was not materially different from the California

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 17: 3-4

guished Breed factually by holding that under Maryland Rule 911,
a juvenile is only subjected to a single proceeding which begins at
the master's hearing and terminates with the adjudication by a
judge.3
The Swisher majority emphasized the non-final nature of the
master's findings and recommendations. Regardless of the master's
proposals, the judge alone is empowered to enter a final order. It was
this factor, according to the Court, that distinguished the Maryland
juvenile procedure from other schemes.33 The Court also rejected the
juveniles' argument that the prosecution was given the opportunity
to convince two factfinders of the merits of the case against them
since Maryland conferred the powers of both factfinder and adjudicator on the juvenile court judge. 6 Moreover, in addition to vesting
adjudicatory power solely in the judge, the Court noted that Rule
911 did not provide the prosecution the opportunity to muster additional evidence for a second trial..The record of the master's hearing
is closed and no new evidence can be received by the judge unless
the juvenile consents. 7
The juveniles, relying on United States v. Jenkins,31 also contended that all proceedings on factual issues should be barred once
there has been a ruling by the court on factual questions in a jeopardy producing proceeding. 9 The majority emphasized, however,
that Jenkins was modified by the subsequent decision in United
juvenile proceeding reviewed in Breed, which involved the use of a referee or master. Id. at
2706 n.12.
34. Id. at 2708.
35. Id. The Swisher Court distinguished United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975),
since it involved appellate review of a final judgment of a trial court fully empowered to enter
the judgment. 98 S. Ct. at 2708. The Court also distinguished on the same grounds Kepner
v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904). There, a Phillipine trial judge acquitted the defendant
and the Phillipine Supreme Court reversed on the government's appeal. The United States
Supreme Court rejected the theory that jeopardy continued until the final decision of the
Phillipine Supreme Court. 98 S. Ct. at 2707 n.15.
36. 98 S. Ct. at 2707.
37. Id. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.
38. 420 U.S. 358 (1975). In Jenkins, the district court dismissed the indictment and
discharged the defendant on his motion to dismiss following a bench trial. The government
appealed, and the Supreme Court concluded that even though it was unclear whether the
dismissal was based on a resolution of the factual issues against the government, the double
jeopardy clause barred the appeal since "further proceedings of some sort devoted to the
resolution of factual issues would have been required." Even supplemental findings without
the additional evidence would have violated the defendant's right. Id. at 369-70.
39. 98 S. Ct. at 2708.
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States v. Scott.4 0 Burger explained that in Scott, the Court decided
that not all proceedings that require supplemental findings are
barred by the double jeopardy clause.4" The prohibition against further factfinding proceedings operates only when a previous trial has
ended in acquittal, in a conviction that was reversed on appeal
because of insufficient evidence,42 or in a mistrial ruling that was not
prompted by manifest necessity.43 Since a juvenile court judge's
hearing does not fall within any of these prescribed exceptions, his
review does not violate the double jeopardy clause."
Justice Marshall, speaking for the dissenters, agreed with the
majority that jeopardy attached at the juvenile's hearing before the
master.4 5 He maintained however, that Rule 911 authorizes the master to perform a factfinding role since it does not require the judge
to make an independent review of the record. 46 Therefore, even if the
master's findings in favor of the juvenile are not regarded as an
acquittal, a judge's factfinding review is precluded since the double
jeopardy clause also protects a defendant's right to be judged by a
particular tribunal. 47 Thus the Maryland scheme, in Marshall's
40. 437 U.S. 82 (1978). Scott was decided on June 14, 1978. The Court's decision in
Swisher was announced on June 28, 1978.
41. 98 S. Ct. at 2708. In Scott, the defendant's motion to dismiss the federal drug charges
against him was granted on the grounds of pre-indictment delay before the jury reached a
verdict. 437 U.S. at 84. The Scott Court said of Jenkins: "It placed unwarrantedly great
emphasis on the defendant's right to have his guilt decided by the first jury . . . so as to
include those cases where the defendant himself seeks to terminate the trial before verdict
on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence. We have therefore decided to overrule
Jenkins..." Id. at 87 (emphasis added). See notes 77 and 78 and accompanying text infra.
42. 98 S. Ct. at 2708. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (appellate court
reversal of conviction based on insufficiency of evidence bars retrial). The Swisher Court also
stated that if a conviction is not reversed on appeal, further proceedings on factual questions
are also barred. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (double jeopardy clause protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and from attempts to
secure additional punishment).
43. 98 S. Ct. at 2708. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978) (retrial not prohibited if mistrial ruling terminating previous trial was required by manifest necessity).
44. 98 S. Ct. at 2708.
45. 98 S. Ct. 2699, 2709 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. The dissent noted that under the provisions of Rule 911b, the master was not merely
used to develop a record for judicial review, since he was directed to make a written report of
his proposed findings for transmittal to the judge. Also, Rule 911d provides that the juvenile
court judge may base his order on the master's findings without reviewing the record. Id. at
2711 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See note 17 supra.
47. 98 S. Ct. at 2710 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949)
(absent manifest necessity for terminating the first proceeding, double jeopardy clause protects defendant's right to go to judgment before a particular tribunal).
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view, circumvented the double jeopardy prohibition against affording the state the opportunity to convince two factfinders of the
juvenile's guilt by merely designating the judge as the only factfinder and decisionmaker.' 8
The second premise upon which Justice Marshall based his dissent was the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. He
contended that the Maryland system of splitting the hearing of
evidence between the master and the judge deprives the juvenile of
the master's perception of the credibility of the testimony, and ignores the importance of the factfinders appraisal of the facts."
Thus, he maintained, the due process clause was violated by the
Maryland procedure. 0 Marshall concluded by stressing that the
majority had not held the Maryland system constitutionally valid
in all respects in Swisher, but only that it did not offend the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.5 '
For more than a decade, the Supreme Court has applied to the
juvenile court system constitutional guarantees associated with tra53
ditional criminal prosecutions." Most recently, in Breed v. Jones,
the Court extended double jeopardy protection to defendants in
juvenile court proceedings. In Breed, the court held that jeopardy
48. 98 S. Ct. at 2713 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 474 (1974) (procedures by which the facts of the case
are determined are as important as the substantive rule of law to be applied).
50. 98 S. Ct. at 2715 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 2714 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority also alluded to an additional
constitutional question involved with Rule 911 when discussing the judge's power to disregard
the master's proposals. Id. at 2707. Chief Justice Burger noted that although it is not usual
in a criminal proceeding for evidence to be presented in the absence of the one authorized to
determine guilt, any objections to such a system do not arise from the guarantees of the
double jeopardy clause. Id. at 2707 n.14.
52. The Court extended the due process requirement of fundamental fairness to juvenile
defendants in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The Court held that the juvenile and his parents
must have timely written notice of the hearing and the facts upon which the charge is based;
that the juvenile has the right to be represented by counsel; that he and his parents must be
notified of the right and also that if they could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed; that a juvenile has the right to remain silent at a delinquency hearing; and absent
a valid confession, a juvenile has the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him. Id. at 55-57.
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof was held to be necessary in juvenile court
proceedings in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971) (Court decided that trial by jury is not constitutionally required in the
adjudicatory phase of state juvenile court delinquency proceeding).
53. 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (jeopardy attaches at adjudicatory hearing in juvenile court, and
therefore defendant is placed in second jeopardy in criminal court proceeding for same offense).
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attached at the adjudicatory hearing54 in juvenile court. Since the
purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the defendant had
committed acts that violated a criminal law, and the potential consequences of the proceeding included the loss of liberty for many
years, the risk inherent in the adjudicatory hearing was indistinguishable from that which is associated with traditional criminal
prosecutions.55 Juvenile proceedings and criminal proceedings were
each found to engender the same elements of anxiety, insecurity,
and heavy personal strain against which the double jeopardy clause
is designed to protect.5 " The Breed Court then concluded that prosecution of the juvenile defendant in criminal court for the same offense for which he had been tried in juvenile court violated the
double jeopardy clause. Even though the proceeding in the criminal
court was based on the record of a preliminary hearing,57 the Court
found that the juvenile was twice put to the task of marshalling his
resources against those of the state, and twice subjected to the
heavy personal strain which accompanies a criminal prosecution."
Because double jeopardy protection has been extended only recently to juvenile defendants, Breed v. Jones seemed to be the sole
controlling precedent before the Court and the background against
which Swisher must be decided. However, the majority in Swisher
concluded that unlike the system in Breed, which exposed the juvenile to second jeopardy upon transfer to adult criminal court, the
Maryland scheme did not subject the juveniles to more than a single
proceeding.5" The Swisher majority's characterization of the Rule
911 system as a single proceeding was based primarily on the master's inability to enter a final order. However, the juvenile court
proceeding in Breed v. Jones was conducted by a referee, which is
the California equivalent of Maryland's master. 0 A careful analysis
of the roles of the sub-judicial officers in the two respective states
indicates that they do not differ in any substantial way that justifies
the disparate treatment afforded by the Court.
In the juvenile court structure before the Breed Court, the referee
54. Id. at 529.
55. Id. at 529-30.
56. Id. at 530-31.
57. Id. at 525. See note 32 supra.
58. Id. at 533.
59. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
60. Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. at 2706 n.12. The proceedings in Breed commenced in the
Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Juvenile Court. 421 U.S. at 521.
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was a subordinate judicial officer whose power to enter a final order
was narrowly circumscribed. Under California law,6 the only express situations in which a referee could issue a final order arose
when the juvenile was found not guilty or the referee recommended
probation.12 In Breed, the defendant was found to have committed
the acts alleged in the petition against him.6 3 At the disposition
hearing, however, the defendant was declared unfit for treatment as
a juvenile and was therefore transferred for prosecution as an adult
on the order of the referee." Based upon California statutory and
case law, 5 the presiding referee did not have the authority to enter
a final order in either of these stages of the juvenile court proceeding. Breed and Swisher were therefore factually indistinguishable on
the grounds of the finality of the initial factfinding proceeding.
The Breed Court did not discuss the role of the referee or his
capacity to enter a final order. 6 Instead, the Court focused on the
substance of the proceedings within the juvenile court system. 7
Chief Justice Burger, in delivering the unanimous Breed decision,
admonished that the juvenile process must be candidly appraised
and that in assessing the constitutionality of state juvenile practices, the courts must avoid analyzing them in terms of labels of
convenience that have traditionally been used to characterize juvenile proceedings.6 8 In light of these considerations, the Swisher decision seems clearly untenable due to the similar adjudicatory powers
of the presiding officers at the juvenile proceedings. In addition, the
Swisher Court's emphasis on the mechanical operation of the Maryland juvenile court system appears inconsistent with the concern for
substance that the Supreme Court articulated in assessing the juvenile court scheme in Breed."
61. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 250 (West 1977).
62. For a comparison of the statutory provisions and court interpretations of Maryland
and California juvenile laws, see Brief for Appellees, supra note 8, at 50-51.
63. 421 U.S. at 522. The petition alleged that Jones had committed acts which would have
constituted the crime of armed robbery if committed by an adult. Id. at 521.
64. Id. at 524.
65. See Bradley v. People, 258 Cal. App. 2d 253, 65 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1968) (referee's order
conditional and subject to review and approval by judge).
66. In discussing the findings and orders issued as a result of the juvenile proceeding, the
Breed Court spoke of the actions of the "juvenile court" or the "court," which was-consistent
with the language of the California statute. See, e.g., 421 U.S. at 521-22.
67. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
68. 421 U.S. at 529.
69. The Breed Court rejected the state's contention that jeopardy continued from the
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In both Swisher and Breed, the sub-judicial officers lacked the
authority to enter a final order prior to the stage in the proceedings
at which the juvenile's case was submitted to a judge. Therefore, if
the Swisher decision is to be distinguished from Breed, the distinction must be based on the difference in the procedures following the
adjudicatory hearings. In Breed, the supplemental factfinding procedure that violated the double jeopardy clause was the submission
of the preliminary hearing record to the adult criminal court.', In
Swisher, Rule 911 allowed a review of the master's record by the
juvenile court judge or the production of new evidence to which the
juvenile did not object." In each situation, a judge with similar
powers makes his decision on the factal issues that had previously
been determined by another factfinder. But in ruling that the supplemental factfinding procedure permitted by the Maryland scheme
did not violate the double jeopardy clause, the Swisher Court
inexplicably made no attempt to distinguish the proceeding in criminal court that took place in Breed.12 Rather, the Court relied on its
decision in United States v. Scott,7 3 and concluded that the supple-

mental factfinding proceedings under Rule 911 were not barred by
4
7
the double jeopardy clause.

In emphasizing the Scott decision, the Supreme court rejected its
decision in United States v. Jenkins,5 which was highly favorable
to the position of the Swisher juveniles. In Jenkins, the Court held
that when a defendant is discharged after jeopardy has attached,
further proceedings devoted to resolving factual issues are violative
of the double jeopardy clause.7 6 A close analysis of the Scott decision
reveals that it apparently merely narrowed the Jenkins rule, and
consequently Maryland Rule 911 should have been held violative of
juvenile court proceeding to adult court and that therefore the defendant was subjected to
only a single proceeding. The fact that the proceedings had not "run their full course" within
the contemplation of the California statute at the time of the transfer did not satisfactorily
explain why the juvenile should be deprived of constitutional protection against a second
trial. 421 U.S. at 534.
70. 421 U.S. at 525. See note 32 supra.
71. See the text of Rules 911c and 911d set forth at note 17 supra.
72. 98 S. Ct. at 2708. The Swisher Court decided that since the master did not have the
authority to enter a final order, the original jeopardy did not terminate. Thus, no second
jeopardy could attach before the juvenile court judge.
73. 437 U.S. 82 (1978). See notes 40-44 and accompanying text supra.
74. 98 S. Ct. at 2708.
75. 420 U.S. 358 (1975). See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
76. Id. at 370.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 17: 3-4

the protection against double jeopardy.
Scott involved an adult criminal trial in which the defendant
sought to terminate the proceedings against him prior to the resolution of the factual questions going to the offense with which he was
charged.77 The sole question before the Scott Court was the applicability of the double jeopardy clause to government appeals from
orders granting defense motions to terminate the trial before verdict.7 8 In deciding that such appeals were not prohibited, the Scott
Court expressly overruled Jenkins." However, Scott left intact the
double jeopardy bar against further prosecution in those situations
where the defendant was in no way responsible for having the
charges against him dismissed.80 Thus, the Scott decision was not
directly applicable to the question before the Swisher Court, since
the exceptions to the master's proposed findings were taken by the
state after the close of the evidence and a decision by the master
on its merits. It therefore appears that the majority's reliance upon
its decision in Scott was misplaced.
In discussing Scott, the Swisher Court noted that a previous trial
ending in acquittal precludes supplemental findings.8 Based on the
reasoning in Breed v. Jones, the Maryland master's decision in favor
of the juvenile defendants should have been given the effect of an
acquittal. Thus, under traditional double jeopardy standards, the
state should have been precluded from taking exceptions to the
master's decision.
In practical terms, the Swisher decision enables a prosecutor in
juvenile court proceedings to buttress his case with new evidence if
the master decides that the facts do not support a finding of delinquency. The fact that the juvenile can prevent additional evidence
77. 437 U.S. at 94. In Scott, the defendant moved to dismiss two counts of an indictment
for federal drug charges on the grounds that his defense had been prejudiced by preindictment delay.
78.. Id. at 84. The Supreme Court was determining the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976),
which allows the United States to appeal from a district court's dismissal of an indictment
except where the double jeopardy clause prohibits further prosecution.
79. See note 41 supra.
80. When a trial court grants the prosecution's motion for a mistrial, a second prosecution
is not barred if the government can demonstrate that the mistrial was precipitated by
"manifest necessity." The purpose of the manifest necessity rule is to insure that the defendant's right to have his trial concluded by a particular tribunal is not lightly subordinated
to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his
evidence to an impartial jury. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
81. 98 S. Ct. at 2708. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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from being presented does not totally remedy the double jeopardy
implications. The juvenile's case can be subtly prejudiced because
the juvenile court judge will know that the state has additional
evidence and that the juvenile refused to allow its presentation. In
addition, the prosecution is afforded the opportunity to convince a
second factfinder of the juvenile's guilt. The presence of such unbridled power that enables a state to attain a guilty verdict is precisely
the abuse that the double jeopardy clause was intended to foreclose.8
Finally, the juvenile court scheme upheld by the Swisher Court
can foster and intensify a negative response by the juvenile toward
the court's rehabilitation efforts. The Supreme Court's past juvenile justice decisions stressed that the underlying purpose for creating a separate system for juvenile offenders was to promote rehabilitative possibilities. 8 Should conviction result because the judge did
not agree with the master's conclusion on the facts, the juvenile may
resist all treatment efforts as a result of his belief that he has been
unfairly persecuted instead of justly prosecuted."
Swisher v. Brady validated juvenile justice proceedings in which
the state can obtain reversal or modification of a master's conclusions upon a review of the record and the receipt of additional
unobjectionable evidence by a juvenile court judge." Since the
Swisher Court did not address the due process question,"7 that issue
may be raised in the future, thus providing the opportunity to review the Maryland scheme in terms of the judge's power to make a
decision based on a cold record. Nevertheless, the Swisher decision
has curtailed the applicability of double jeopardy protection to juvenile defendants. The state can conduct factfinding on two levels
within the juvenile justice system by characterizing the first factfinder's determination as a mere proposal. A system that would
82. J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 155 (1964).
83. Carr, The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Clause on Juvenile Proceedings, 6 U. TOL.
L. REv. 1, 19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Clausei.
84. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1967); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 550-51 (1971). See also note 52 supra.
85. See The Effect of the Double Jeopardy Clause, supra note 83, at 19. See also Brief for
Appellees, supra note 8, at 93-96.
86. In addition to Maryland, thirty-three states utilize sub-judicial officers in juvenile
court proceedings. Because of variations in procedures, only seventeen of those states present
the same double jeopardy issue raised in Swisher. Brief for National Juvenile Law Center as
Amicus Curiae at 19-22, Swisher v. Brady, 98 S. Ct. 2699 (1978).
87. See notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.

910

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 17: 3-4

have been constitutionally invalid in a traditional criminal prosecution because of supplemental factfinding was upheld by the Swisher
Court to meet the exigencies of the heavy juvenile caseload." The
Supreme Court's extension of double jeopardy protection to defendants in the juvenile justice system and the Court's application of
the double jeopardy principle in traditional criminal prosecutions
should have mandated a contrary result in Swisher.
Christine L. Donohue
88.

98 S. Ct. at 2705.

